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July 9, 2014

The Revolution or Delusion in Military Affairs?

The Revolution or Delusion in Military Affairs? 
By Leo Kee Chye

With the recent spectacular success of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US forces has once again demonstrated the superiority and inevitability of RMA (Revolution of Military Affairs) -based warfare. RMA is nothing new; a decade ago in Operation Desert Storm, the US forces with their pinpoint accurate bombs, their commanders’ real-time view of the battlefield, their well-coordinated branches of the armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) and their special operations, had already heralded a new epoch in warfare. War is never the same as before. Or is it?

RMA is today an international buzzword and like other buzzwords, it is less clear in what it exactly means, for different people interpret it differently. In general, we can subscribe the meaning to as “A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs only when a new civilisation arises to challenge the old, when an entire society transforms itself, forcing its armed services to change at every level simultaneously ­ from technology and culture to organisation, strategy, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics.” (Toffler 1993:32).

Unlike the RMA in history, this revolution is not attributed to or driven by a narrowly defined area like a particular breakthrough in technology such as the development of nuclear weapons. Nor to an idea like how resources can be mobilised as in the implementation of “people’s war,” which started with Napoleon’s mass mobilisations of citizen-soldiers, and was perfected by Mao Zedong, who used guerrilla-warfare to overwhelm larger and better-equipped conventional armies. Nor even to development in a new war operation and tactic like blitzkrieg or carrier airpower and submarine during World War II. In fact, this modern RMA seems to encompass all. New technologies like precision weapons and stealth aircraft have radically altered how war should be conducted. This, in turn, influence how, at the top, war policies and strategies should be made, right down to the operation and tactical levels on how battles be fought in the fields. Moreover, with information as the pillar of this revolution, coordination between the different branches of military as well as the different hierarchies in decision-making, is close to that of real-time as well as bypassing red tapes and duplications; hence, translating into a much leaner and meaner military structure.

Before one gets too carry away with the coming of age of “Star Wars” and misses the forest for the trees, let’s turn to classical works on strategy and war by Sun Tze, Clausewitz and Jomini for illumination. Though technological revolution in war has accelerated to a pace and to a level never before imagined, certain basic concepts still remain unchanged. But the infinitely complexity of technological advancement may obscure the underlying purpose and principle of warfare.

War is never an end in itself but a means to end, that is, war serves to fulfill a political objective. “When whole communities go to war…the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object.” (Clausewitz p86). Military victory does not automatically translate into political victory. We cannot all often reminded that despite the decisive victory of US-led coalition in the Gulf War 1991-92, they still fell short of the political objective of removing Saddam Hussein. The initial stunning successes of Germany’s blitzkrieg operations in WWII did not serve to meet the Germans’ political objectives, if they had one, but eventually led to the total capitulation of Germany when the greater economic forces and the resolve of the Allies overwhelmed the Germans. Moreover, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Min realised that through constant military operations together with patience and resolution, even in absence of decisive military victories, they could still achieve political victories. It still remains to be seen the current Operation Iraqi Freedom will ultimately achieve the political agendas of the US.

Just as military victory does not necessarily guarantee political victory, technological revolution in military does not also ensure winning war. “The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war; it does not, of itself, gain battles.” (Jomini p47). The inability of the US to win the war in Vietnam and Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan are glaring examples, despite their superiority in military capability. Or as retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Ripper put it, “What we have are a lot of buzzwords floating around associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs…It’s ludicrous to suggest that such concepts as ‘information dominance’ will now somehow make all the military doctrine that came before it irrelevant.” (Kitfield 1998). Technological revolution is at most a necessary condition not a sufficient one in winning war. One should never fail to factor in the economic impacts, supports from the public and even the cooperation of allies in order to win battles. Moreover, though advance weapons may extremely effective in achieving decisive victory in short engagement, the same cannot be saíd for protracted war. Sun Tze could not stress more when he wrote: “For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.” Unfortunately, the world is increasingly seeing a greater role for asymmetrical warfare by which the “inferior” can engage the “superior” and most often they involve protracted fighting.

With the dazzlingly arrays of military technologies, one may be carelessly led to believe that the “fog of war” shall be a thing of the past which is right in the face of military theorists like Clausewitz who maintained that “The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently – like the effect of a fog or moonshine – gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.” (Clausewitz p99). Interestingly, the main thrust of the RMA seeks to reduce the “fog of war”, but the recent invasion of Iraqi demonstrated that even the most advanced technology does not eliminate it. The whole coalition army so far has yet to find weapons of mass destruction despite this being the main reason for the invasion. At this writing, the US Senate Intelligence Committee released a report, claiming that the CIA’s prewar estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were overstated and unsupported by intelligence.

In conclusion
We cannot deny that the RMA has indeed altered the way wars are fought and strategies and policies being made, even in the midst of exaggeration, rhetorics, and overtly optimism surrounding RMA. No country can afford to ignore the implications and potentials of RMA in future warfare. But the author of this essay seeks to highlight the danger of becoming too entrenched in sophisticated technologies for one could lose sight of military strategic thinking and other factors are needed to win the battle as well as to achieve the political objectives that trigger the war in the first place.

First, aforementioned, RMA should not be seen merely to win wars but alongside, to assist and clarify, political decision making since “No one starts a war…without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how intends to conduct it.” (Clausewitz p579). War, more often than not, is dominated by chance, friction and uncertainty, and never turns out as one expects. With “…the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences,” (Clausewitz p92), the RMA should perhaps gear towards complementing the changing circumstances and objectives as the war progresses.

Second, equally important is to know that military technology is merely a tool. Other ingredients are required for a concoction of potent mix. During WWII, many countries possessed the same crucial technologies, but only a few exploited the technologies through incorporating new operations and tactical concepts. French and Britain during the Second War World had aircraft, radios and tanks, but it was German Wehrmacht which integrated these into the Panzer division to accomplish unparalleled victories in the beginning of the war.

Third, the prospect of asymmetric warfare to reduce the effectiveness and superior technologies of the RMS is not inconceivable. The RMA would only prompt poorer countries to seek alternative strategies to counter the superior nations. Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote; “The limit of my world is the limit of my language.” In military affairs, perhaps the limit of warfare is the limit of one’s imagination is more appropriate.

  • von Clausewitz. 1968 edition, “On War”, based on J.J. Graham translation. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
  • Jomini, Baron Antone-Henri de, 1996 edition. “The Art of War.” Greenhill Books.
  • Kitfield, James. 1998, “To Halt an Enemy.” Journal of Air Force Association. January 1998 Vol. 81, No. 1. Website: www.afa.org/magazine/jan1998/0198tohal.asp
  • Toffler, A. and Toffler, H. 1993, “War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century”, Diane Pub Co.

Friday, July 9, 2004