Book Review
Title: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Author: Thomas S. Kuhn
Publisher: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 2nd ed. Chicago.
By Leo Kee Chye
Despite written in the 60s, reading it now still pays off tremendously in some unexpected way. Hence, together with other reasons unknown, I decided to write a review on it. Allow me to borrow Kuhn’s concept of paradigm: we may be reading the same stuff but we may not interpret them similarly. Perhaps, you from your own paradigmatic perspective can offer better and alternative insights than I can from my paradigm.
The man and his book
At first sight, the book looks innocuous and unimpressive, unbefitting a supposedly intellectual masterpiece. The cover page is designed with a very simplistic pattern that has the effect of from one angle, one will see the exterior of boxes and from another, the interior of boxes—a kind of visual illusion. Unwittingly, I had actually found the pattern distasteful and that book illustrator’s ability left a lot to be desired; little did I suspect, the pattern was judiciously selected to depict the very gist of Kuhn’s philosophy: paradigm. ‘Paradigm’ is a concept first coined by Thomas Kuhn in the 60s. And since then, the physicist turned philosopher
took the scientific community by storm, but not without great controversies and disputes. Today, his philosophy has gained acceptance by and large. Few, I think, would still scoff at him; no one, I believe, would be foolish enough to ignore him altogether.
Paradise
For the last few centuries in the history of Mankind, we are fortunate to witness the unprecedented advancement in a discipline that we proudly call science. Never before has Man so successful in this endeavour to understand, control and subdue the forces around us where our primitive ancestors could only tremble at the very thought of them. And this linear, undisrupted, progressive accumulation of knowledge seem hinting to us that ‘paradise’—the ultimate truth—is just round the corner…or is it?
Paradise lost, paradigm gained
Paradise? No paradise, only paradigm, retorts Kuhn. In his book, the spoilsport wastes little time in demolishing the hope Man pins on: Science will lead us to the truth ultimately. Paradigm is a system that encompasses theories, concepts, models, procedures and techniques (or in shorts, a kind of outlook) that will heavily shape/condition:
Within the paradigm (normal science) During a period of which a particular paradigm is accepted by the scientific community that Kuhn refers to as a period of normal science, research will be directed to the refinement of theories and development of apparatus to fit observations with theories developed within that paradigm. Competing theories developed within that paradigm can be tested in accord to the experiments or apparatus (external consistency) and rules of logic (internal consistency). It is only during periods of normal science that progress seems both obvious and assured (Kuhn, pp. 163). To scientists, at least, the results gain in normal research…add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can be applied (ibid., pp. ?).
Within a particular paradigm, anomalies (when observations do not fit the theories) are seldom discovered since scientist will often dismiss them as rounding-up errors, imprecision of apparatus, poor experimental design et cetera. It is only when these anomalies persisted, these and these alone inevitably signal crisis for the reigning paradigm. Also, large anomalies, which are difficult to dismiss as rounding-up errors, imprecision of apparatus et cetera, are seldom discovered unexpectedly and suddenly since aforementioned, presiding paradigm surreptitiously shapes the kind of experiments a scientist designs and the kind of data he collects. Hence, often, if not always, large anomalies were only to be discovered when a portion of the scientific community has pledged allegiance to a new paradigm. And within that new paradigm, the new experimental designs might stumble upon large anomalies that the new paradigm can accommodate but not the old paradigm. In Kuhn’s words (ibid. pp. 77), “…crisis is a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories (under a new paradigm).”
Choice of paradigm
Competing theories from competing paradigms can never be unequivocally settled by logic and experiment. The reason is that construction of tests and theories that must proceed from within either one or another paradigm, but in doing so, the results obtained are inherently incommensurate with one another. Kuhn (ibid. pp. 145) added, “…there cannot be scientifically or empirical neutral system of language or concepts.” and, “Only within the paradigm, can competing theories be tested in accord to the experiments or apparatus designed.”
What determines the triumph of one paradigm over the other is how well a paradigm can explain a particular anomaly that is deemed acute and significant within the scientific community at that particular period of time. Of course, the new paradigm must also preserve a large part of the problem-solving ability of the old paradigm. But the point Kuhn wants to make is that the very idea of a particular anomaly that is deemed significant by the scientific community at that particular time is not a rational but a arational criteria for evaluating competing paradigm (I use arational instead of irrational for reason I will explain later). Bases on an arational criterion, a scientist’s decision to convert to the new paradigm is very much to do with his faith, aestheticism, and pragmatism towards a particular issue. (I use aestheticism here because some theories are intellectually and/or mathematically appealing and this attracted scientists). Hence, such a paradigm shift is not and cannot constitute to what we would call a scientific progress.
Is the old paradigm wrong?
The quantitative success of the new paradigm will slowly and surely proselytes some scientists from the old paradigm and indoctrinates the young and rising breed of scientists. There still will be some old diehards who hold their old paradigm tenaciously to their chests, and only until the last of them expires could we say the new paradigm triumphed: Even then, we could not say they are wrong. Or, as Max Planck succinctly puts it:
A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and make them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.
These diehards are not what you commonly brand as obstinate old fools who resist changes and new things. What they disagree or have difficulties in accepting is the arational criteria used in favouring the new paradigm, and that is because they do not share the kind of faith, aestheticism and pragmatism as the proselytes of the new paradigm. Because the two camps hold different paradigmatic perspective, a law/assumption that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientist may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another (ibid., pp. 150). Kuhn offered an excellent example for this case: with regard to gravity we now call, in Aristotle’s and Descartes’ science, attempts were made to explain this attractive force. But when Newton’s theory reigned, this question was conveniently and mysteriously purged from science. Surprisingly and interestingly, this question resurfaced and, again, being explained but this time by Einstein’s theory of Relativity. Those faithful to Aristotle’s and Descartes’ camp cannot accept the idea that gravity is innate and required no explanation; hence, rejected Newtonian’s gravity, all because they felt that explaining gravity is of a higher priority than solving practical problems. Thus, when a particular paradigm is accepted, some questions may be made obsolete or unanswerable, or simply inhibited from asking. Also, what may seem to be a questionable fact/assumption might be taken as self-evident instead under a new paradigm.
Indoctrination of new paradigm.
This will bring back to the previous section: Within the paradigm. The whole process may start all over again. In the perpetuation of the new paradigm, the new generation will be bred, raised and fed within it and the tacitly filtering of the supposedly leap of faith in their normal science education, have given them an inevitable delusion that science is progressive, linear and cumulative.
So, where will this lead us?
No where! shrugged Kuhn. In the Origin of Species by Charles Darwin, Kuhn cited, there is no goal or purpose whatsoever ascribed to the process of natural selection, other than to ensure the survivability of a species with genetics traits most conducive to the external environment at that time. And this only to result in evolving a more elaborate and complex organism best survived the condition at that period. In similar veins, science evolves rather than progresses with no specify goal on hand. Kuhn also believes that science might not continue forever, even in the normal state. A state will be reached when there are no resources available and any headway made, we will be stuck in this paradigm forever (Horgan, pp. 46).
Comments
In retrospect, I find the concept of paradigm insightful, engaging and thought-provocative; it offers an alternate perspective of science that is diametrically different from what we tend to perceive. However the difficulty I need to grapple when reading his book, apart from his impalpable style of writing, is how he defines paradigm. He does it by making it rather vague, and probably for good reason. The concept can sweepingly refer to a myriad of things differ both in kind and degree. Exacerbating this problem, his concept of paradigm precludes or inhibits any form of empirical corroboration since Kuhn, in his book, maintained, “…there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts, then the proposed construction of alternative tests or theories must proceed from within one or another paradigm-based tradition.” Therefore the tests and apparatus developed within our paradigm cannot confirm nor refute his theory. Despite all, Kuhn, by appealing to a plethora of historical events, still manages to make strong argument for his case. Given that the concept of paradigm is vague, it is difficult to filter out any unconforming historical case to refute his theory. Hence, his theory, at best, if it is right it is right; at worst, if it is wrong, there is no way we can know about it.
Another area I differ with Kuhn is his attack on Popper’s falsification concept. Kuhn held that (ibid., pp. 146-147), “if any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times. On the other hand, if only severe failure justifies theory rejection, then the Popperians will require some criteria of improbability or of degree of falsification.” Kuhn rightly points out that all theories, hitherto, fail in some respects and the criteria for favouring one theory over another is a value-laden rather the value-free judgement. He, however, is not quite right in deducing it into—all theories ought then to be rejected. Karl Popper’s falsification concept actually serves to demarcate science from pseudo science. A scientific theory differentiates itself from a pseudo science theory by having at least one conceivably and empirically testable hypothesis. The existence of UFO or ghost, for example, is something occasionally verified by some photos and sightings but there is no way whatsoever to refute/test it conclusively. In contrast, for the case of Einstein’s general theory of relatively, Sir Arthur Eddington had managed to confirm a key prediction—the slight bending of a starbeam by the sun’s gravity—of the theory. The confirmation although cannot verify but at least have the power to refute the hypothesis should the result turns otherwise. According to the paradigm concept, since the concept of falsification is developed within a particular paradigm (science), its criteria can, at most, allow it to distinguish theories of its paradigm from other theories of another paradigm (pseudo-science).
Interestingly, Kuhn’s paradigm concept should be considered pseudo science since it falls out of the falsification criteria when, aforementioned, there is not at least one conceivable and empirically refutable test constructable for it. Of course, that does not mean it is wrong. In my own opinion, Kuhn has rightly pointed out the limitation of Popper’s falsification which is only an ideal to be aspired to, but difficult to approximate into actual practice. Even the demarcation between science and pseudo science I pointed out above, in actual practice there might be a continuum with penumbra or gray areas between them and is not as clear-cut as we might believe.
After finishing Kuhn’s book, I was (and still is) greatly perplexed by a possibility that mystics/religious-fanatics (or crackpots which I prefer to call them) who happen to come across Kuhn’s work and might exploit this concept of paradigm to advance their own vested interest. They can always defend their stance by claiming that their knowledge is from another paradigm, which is another way of perceiving the world, and it is not wrong. This to a certain extent emasculates the power of objectivity and rationality which science so proudly epitomizes? Till now, I have yet to find a powerful argument to attack them on this.
References:
Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 1970.
Horgan, John, The End of Science, UK: Abacus, 1996.
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leokeechye@gmail.com
Categories
Philosophy
Tags
Epistemology, Knowledge, Philosophy, Science